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Narrating the French National Story: The Role of Discourse in the Production of Frenchness 
 
Dinner Time History Lessons  
When I studied abroad in France during the spring of 2015 I lived with a French couple in Vanves, 
a town that, because of its location a few kilometers outside of Paris, was considered part of the 
proche banlieue, or “close suburbs.” The American understanding of suburban areas is generally 
synonymous with neighborhoods of single family homes and green, fenced-in lawns that are 
associated with the middle-class and these neighborhoods may be located a great distance from a 
major city. In the French context banlieue refers to a collection of municipalities that directly 
surround a larger city. Urban in appearance, they are filled with concrete apartment complexes 
flanked by supermarkets, corner cafes, and other local businesses. Squares containing the town 
hall and local cathedrals and mosques constitute a more open space in the town. In the Parisian 
banlieue each city sees itself as carrying a distinct identity, yet as a result of certain cities being 
classified as troubled zones the banlieue as a whole is often perceived as an isolated space that 
“stands for alterity, insecurity, and deprivation” (Dikeç 2007, 8).  
In Vanves I lived with a fellow American and our host parents in the two floor apartment 
that they owned. As students, and as American students in particular, my roommate and I were 
always the pupils. In addition to the courses that we took at French universities during the day, 
whenever we were at home our host father and mother would instruct us in the French (and 
therefore proper) way of doing things. Speaking only in French with the two of us, rigorously 
preparing traditional French dinners each week, and exhibiting their strong catholic identity were 
some of the ways in which our parents could be considered as ideal français d’origine1 citizens. 
As if to confirm my observations, my host father would often point out the merits of my living 
with such an authentic French family.  
It was my host mother who prepared dinner for the four of us twice a week and the two to 
three hour meal provided an opportunity for my roommate and I to share details about the material 
we were covering in our classes, the sights we were visiting in Paris, and the other destinations in 
Europe where we were traveling. For the majority of the observations that we made regarding 
France our host parents would nod in agreement; consenting to my depiction of the Musée 
d’Orsay’s Impressionist exhibit, or my roommate’s account of her trip to the Palace of 
Fontainebleau, for instance, with hearty approval. It was as if, through our descriptions, we were 
successfully confirming the beauty of the country’s capital city and historical valor of the patrie.  
My host parents would also comment on our stories with specific insights based on their 
own experiences as French and European citizens. My host father in particular would pick out a 
point in the conversation and proceed to provide historic context for it. For instance, speaking of 
Fontainebleau, did we know that Napoleon’s second wife, Austrian archduchess Marie Louise, 
first went to live there in 1810? And had we seen her bedchamber when we visited? Through the 
insistence on linking details of our daily activities in France to specific moments in French history 
my host parents – and specifically my host father – were able to offer an informal way of testing 
our preexisting knowledge of the French Republic and fill in the gaps of our social, linguistic, 
religious and especially our historical understanding of the country. 
The way in which my host father would discuss French history at the dinner table left a 
profound impression on me. His accounts were in no way a simple recitation of facts, but rather 
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an almost personal narration of historic events. He would recall specific details from moments in 
the lives of different figures and speak about them in a way that made it seem like the event had 
taken place a few days ago rather than decades prior. I was continually struck by how my host 
father gave the impression he had lived through many of the events he discussed. If I had not been 
aware of the era during which Napoleon Bonaparte lived, for instance, I might have thought that 
the two of them were contemporaries. This particular way of speaking about history contributed 
to an overall sense that events and figures who belonged to France’s past were accessible in the 
present moment.  
One instance in particular that has remained nestled in my memory was the evening that 
my host father asked if either of us were familiar with Charles Martel and the Battle of Tours. He 
had been discussing the trip he had taken to Poitiers a few days prior and in the middle of his 
speech he posed the rhetorical question. Looking around the table he began to elaborate, explaining 
that Poitiers was the northern most point in Europe that Muslim armies were able to occupy. 
Consider that, the armies had been able to reach as far as central France! However, the armies were 
not able to stay in the area for long because Charles Martel’s own army fought them off until they 
retreated into Spain. I interpreted this last pronouncement along the lines of “What a relief! France 
was rid of the Muslim armies!” His enthusiasm at this ending to the story was palpable and it 
seemed as though he was trying to elicit excitement from the two of us as well. During the brief 
history lesson we nodded along to show we understood the details of the story, yet we did not 
supply the animated reactions he seemed to be searching our faces for.  
The prominent quality that I detected in the moment was a certain spirit of pride regarding 
Charles Martel’s victory which was rather perplexing. For example, choosing to include the event 
within the French historical record and claim Martel as French was curious considering that he 
lived hundreds of years before the creation of the modern French State. This obsession with 
recalling moments from a past my host father himself did not live through and the great pride that 
he displayed regarding them transported an event like the Battle of Tours from its 1,200 year old 
dwelling place to reside within everyday discourse.  
The practice of placing current-day social, political, and economic issues within a historical 
context is observable in the official discourse of the French State. The Republic has long 
memorialized figures and events regarded as having honored the nation. The Panthéon in Paris, 
for example, constitutes a secular shrine for the great philosophers, writers, and statesmen that the 
French government entombed alongside one other. The physical monuments that stand throughout 
the country in honor of France’s heritage reflect the mental ones the State has erected in the minds 
of “native” French citizens. The conversations that I had with my host father regarding French 
history appear to be evidence of how official discourse successfully extends itself into local ones. 
The structure that allows this relationship to function is that of a specifically français d’origine 
habitus2 which I posit is characterized by a historical narrative. This narrative is relayed through 
mythological terms3 and excludes certain French citizens, particularly Arab Muslim immigrants. 
While Arab Muslim immigrants are legally citizens of the French Republic, they are 
consistently denied cultural citizenship4 in French society. They are seen as incapable of acquiring 
“Frenchness” to its fullest extent and thus represent an Other in the collective. While nationality, 
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genealogy, race, and religious and cultural practices all play a role in defining French cultural 
citizenship and although native French citizens present this cultural identity as unchanging, it is 
ultimately through the debate français d’origine hold on what constitutes Frenchness that 
Frenchness is produced. An integral component of the production of Frenchness consists of 
conceptualizing it in opposition to Arab Muslim members of the population through discourses 
that possess a “transparency of language”5 that make Frenchness appear essential. 
As lived experience is frequently distinct from a particular group’s account of it, I explore 
the story that the French “tell themselves about themselves”6 and the ways in which it approaches 
questions of alterity in French society. Just as Joan Wallach Scott states that The Politics of the 
Veil (2007) is not a study of French Muslims, but rather a study of the “dominant French view of 
them” (10) I endeavor to position myself alongside other social scientists whose work I address 
throughout this piece (Alduy and Wahnich 2015; Amiraux, 2009; Bowen 2007; Epstein 2011; 
Fassin 2006; Guénif, 2007; Keaton 2006; Scott 2007; Thomas 2013) who study nationalism and 
Frenchness in relation to the Other in France. I have chosen to engage with Front National (FN) 
leader Marine Le Pen’s Assises Présidentielles speech, Caroline Fourest’s socio-political essay 
Génie de la laïcité, and the Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration’s (CNHI) permanent 
exhibit Repères in order to examine how Frenchness is produced in relation to Arab Muslim 
immigrants living in France. Although these forms of discourse position themselves differently in 
relation to one another, the three ultimately converge in how they interpret alterity and produce 
Frenchness. 
 
Multiculturalism in France 
At the center of the question of alterity today lies a debate on the role ethnicity, race, religion, and 
culture each play in the context of multicultural societies. In a discussion on Frenchness it is crucial 
to distinguish between these terms because the social actors who participate in its production 
frequently conflate them. French society could be considered multicultural for the range of cultural 
practices that its citizens engage in as well as multiethnic for the collection of ethnic backgrounds 
that its members represent.7 The effort to conflate these terms contributes to the process of othering 
certain citizens. This conflation is apparent in the discourses I examine and it constitutes a major 
object of my study. Oftentimes, aspects of these different categories are exchanged for one another. 
In the context of Arab and Muslim citizens living in France, for instance, defining features Islam 
are frequently associated with Arab citizens and cultural traits that could be associated with 
Arabness are transferred to Muslim citizens of different races and ethnic backgrounds.  
Additionally, certain aspects of citizens’ identities outweigh others in society’s perceptions 
of them. For example, in terms of native French citizens, genealogy and race constitute a greater 
defining factor than cultural practices. In the case of the Arab Muslim immigrant certain cultural 
practices that are perceived as being at odds with French ones are used to point to the overall 
unassimilability of these citizens. As a result, despite Arab Muslim immigrants' ability to speak 
French according to societal standards, their knowledge of French history, or their choice to engage 
in local communities, they are still viewed as incapable of fully participating in or representing 
Frenchness. 
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In France the social contract claims to extend equal rights to all citizens by simple virtue 
of their presence in the collective and French universalism states that citizens’ origins should not 
interfere with their access to these rights. Nonetheless, Arab Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants living in France are treated differently than the citizens who see themselves as 
constituting the “native” population whose ancestry is “rooted” in France and who often represent 
the white, catholic, bourgeois population. The concept of being rooted in a certain geographical 
location is very significant in French thinking and is evidenced by the presence of the term français 
de souche which translates directly to “French of the root;” referring to how the majority of one’s 
anterior generations were born in France (Le Bras 1998). The controversial term first appeared in 
print in Edouard Marchand’s 1892 nationalist publication France Aux Français! and ever since 
has sought to essentialize certain citizens living in France and exclude others whose origins are 
seen as being rooted elsewhere.  
The term that French social scientists often employ to refer to French citizens who are able 
to trace the majority of their family’s anterior generations to having been born in France is français 
d’origine. To refer to a French citizen with a longer heritage outside of the country the term 
français d’origine étrangère is frequently employed. Through my study I will refer to citizens who 
identify as white, of catholic heritage, and bourgeois as français d’origine and to Arab Muslim 
citizens as français d’origine étrangère in instances where I seek to emphasize a French social 
perspective. While some scholars may argue that employing these terms reinforces the idea that 
certain citizens are entitled to live in France while others are not, I hope to draw attention to the 
paradox of French universalism regarding the promise that all citizens are guaranteed equal rights. 
In addition, the French State’s refusal to pursue racial and ethnic studies in regard to its population 
(Fassin 2006) impedes its ability to recognize and more profoundly interpret social conflict within 
its borders. As a result, citizens seen as français d’origine étrangère are not given an opportunity 
to express the mistreatment they face in French society. Anthropologists and sociologists who 
study postcolonial social cohesion in France often describe français d’origine étrangère citizens as 
excluded and invisible (Epstein 2011; Fassin 2006; Noiriel 1988; Sayad 1999; Thomas 2013). I 
argue that français d’origine citizens dominate the collective imaginary through varied forms of 
discourse that deny full cultural citizenship to Arab Muslim immigrant members of society.  
 Being in possession of full cultural citizenship in France equates to satisfying the 
conditions of Frenchness that, as I explain above, are used to evaluate legal citizens’ level of 
belonging within the collective. There are a number of factors that can be used to determine if one 
may pass from legal to cultural citizenship. The way one speaks French is a large signifier of how 
French one is perceived to be. Being able to speak Modern Standard French without the trace of 
an accent constitutes an ideal within Frenchness that français d’origine highly value. Whenever 
individuals do not fulfill this expectation there is an active effort on the part of français d’origine 
citizens to point out this difference. During the time she spent in middle and high schools in Seine 
Saint-Denis Anthropologist Julie Kleinman (2016) describes how teachers who she worked 
alongside at these banlieue city schools would mock the “housing project vernacular” or the 
“langage des cités” of their Arab, Muslim, and African students (263). The “culture talk” these 
educators employed reinforced the idea that their students were fundamentally different from them 
and could never be fully French.  
 A further way by which a member of French society’s Frenchness may be assessed occurs 
at the local level and includes the degree to which one engages in community events. In Collective 
Terms (2011) Beth Epstein describes how français d’origine inhabitants at her field site Cergy-St. 





were seriously dismayed whenever certain residents (often identifiable as français d’origine 
étrangère in most cases) did not take part. Finally, the scope of knowledge regarding French history 
that one possesses similarly works to determine one’s position vis à vis Frenchness. As evidenced 
by interactions with my host father, a consistent understanding of French historic events and 
famous figures aids in solidifying one’s French identity. The signification that français d’origine 
citizens place on French history could be why my host father was so intent on instructing my 
roommate and I whenever he had the opportunity. The impression our dinner time history lessons 
left me with was that my host father considered himself to be a sort of guardian of French historical 
knowledge that he was obligated to share so as to reaffirm his position as français d’origine.  
Despite a strong emphasis on successfully displaying certain practices in order to attain 
Frenchness, the possession of a certain “culture” ultimately supersedes the mastery of these 
practices. As with Frenchness, this culture is associated with the français d’origine and is produced 
through the ever changing discussion on its makeup.  While all français d’origine should ideally 
display the practices discussed above, when certain individuals do not, they remain tied to the 
larger group of native French citizens as part of this culture instead of being considered Other. The 
same type of cultural stigmatization that allows Arab Muslim immigrants to be perceived as 
fundamentally different is evident in the treatment of pieds noirs in France. Pieds Noirs are French 
citizens who were born in colonial North Africa and were repatriated once each former colony 
gained independence. Pieds noirs face a stigmatization in France that is very similar to the social 
exclusion and negative perceptions that Arab Muslim immigrants experience even though they 
could be classified as white, catholic, and bourgeois (Smith 2006). I argue the treatment that pieds 
noirs receive is founded in French colonial thought that distinguished between the “civilized” and 
the “uncivilized.”  
 In the French colonial context there was an emphasis on being educated through the French 
system and possessing familiarity with French cultural practices in order for colonial subjects to 
successfully gain citizenship and enter into “civilized” society. Although this process was a means 
by which members of French colonies could become civilized, the colonial administrators also 
stressed that these members maintain a certain degree of “nativeness.” Emanuelle Saada (2012) 
posits that this contradictory practice in the French colonies was a result of the effort to preserve 
the colonizing mission and keep French citizens born in France as the core of civilization. I argue 
that this aspect of French colonial history directly influences today’s belief that citizens whose 
origins are exterior to France can never become fully French. Similarly, when colonial 
administrators spent extended amounts of time with natives they were seen as experiencing the 
reverse of Europeanization – nativization – and in this way became “decivilized.” This inverse 
case regarding the French-born residents of the colonies is also visible today in the way 
government-run institutions treat foreigners. 
Through his study of administrative booths at prefecture offices in France, French 
sociologist Alexis Spire (2008) demonstrates that civil servants who process immigrants’ requests 
for asylum believe that working with these foreigners devalues their position. Spire details the 
French civil servants’ perspective below: 
 
The devaluation of these services [immigration-related work] is longstanding. The 
value of an administrative booth is proportional to the rank of the people that it 
welcomes, the civil immigration workers find themselves somewhat relegated by 






As a result of the civil servants’ belief that the immigrants who they are processing are unclean, a 
certain hierarchy emerges at local prefecture offices that is based on each employee’s proximity 
to the immigrant body. For example, working at the fingerprint scanning machine entails direct 
contact with immigrants and is the least desired job at the prefecture office thus constituting the 
lowest point in the prefecture hierarchy. The mentality present in French bureaucratic work 
regarding cleanliness and uncleanliness could be seen as parallel to the civilized-uncivilized 
perspective that characterized the French State’s relationship to its colonies. Although Saada posits 
that it is problematic to view colonial practices in terms of a basis for current day racial 
discrimination and although different historical periods do provide for varied sets of social 
practices, in order to best interpret current-day definitions of Frenchness it is crucial to consider 
all of its influences, including its colonial heritage. 
 As French society excludes Arab Muslim immigrants in a multitude of ways, different 
scholars have debated the roles of the state in relation to these citizens’ collective agency. 
Anthropologist Paul Silverstein (2007) asserts that through its multiethnic composition French 
society has become a “New France” where the interplay of state influence and immigrant practices 
mutually construct subject formation (5). I argue that immigrant perspectives and practices work 
to reinforce their position of otherness instead of widening the collective French discourse. Figures 
in positions of power in France today wield Frenchness as a tool of divisiveness through presenting 
Frenchness as a natural state that non-native French are simply unable to achieve. At the same time 
that French cultural citizenship is interpreted as naturally occurring, its loyal guardians produce 
discourses that rely on specific philosophical, historic, linguistic, and religious constructions that 
shift and transform from century to century. French institutions, political parties, media outlets, 
and the French government work together to mold these constructions into a form that français 
d’origine citizens consume. The Front National, in particular, seeks to reinforce the idea that 
certain citizens are unassimilable. The way in which the current leader of the party, Marine le Pen, 
situates the party in relation to the principles of the State strengthens this positionality in surprising 
new ways. 
 
Marine Le Pen’s France 
France is an act of love, this love has a name: patriotism. It is the latter that makes 
our hearts beat as one at the resounding sound of the Marseillaise or when our 
national colors flutter in the wind of history.8 
 
This excerpt from Front National (FN) leader Marine Le Pen’s Assises Présidentielles speech 
constitutes a reminder to her supporters that France is a nation whose specific heritage and culture 
make it unique in Europe, so it is imperative that its citizens defend it from the fundamentalist 
threat hovering nearby that seeks to destroy it. The subtle apocalyptic references that Le Pen 
frequently includes amidst her rallying implorations to stand in support of French values echoes 
the type of nationalist rhetoric that has been on the rise in the West.  
In February 2017 Marine Le Pen launched her presidential campaign with an event – the 
Assises Présidentielles – where she declared that the upcoming election was unlike any other in 
French history because this election constituted a “choice of civilization.” She went on to assure 
the attendees of the event that she represented the candidate best poised to rectify the “decades of 
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error and cowardice” that France has experienced. Unable to attend the event in person, I draw 
from the video that the FN published on its website.9 While watching a recording of the event 
invariably results in a different set of observations, I argue that examining the FN’s own 
presentation of the Assises Présidentielles allows for a particular narrative to emerge regarding the 
way in which the audience and the space interact. The FN’s recording of the speech includes 
generous footage inside the convention hall where the array of colors, symbols, and text filling the 
space indicate as to the particular type of Frenchness the party espouses.  
The video opens with a pan of audience members seated in a stadium-style venue. The 
stage is draped in royal blue carpeting, framed by curtains of the same color, and adorned by three 
French flags. Ceiling-high, white, luminescent roses projected onto the blue velvet curtains 
complement the image on the screen: “Marine Présidente” written in white text with a drawing of 
a slender white rose separating the two words. The audience is rather luminescent itself as the 
majority of the members are wearing buttons that flash red, white, and blue. This blinking motion 
accompanied by the continuous waving of flags seems to consume the room in movement. In 
contrast to the collection of French flags, navy “Marine Présidente” banners, and the white signs 
inscribed with the campaign expression “In the Name of the People” fluttering across the crowd 
there is a series of fixed expressions projected on the walls above the audience that echo those 
written on the banners below. 
Distinct from the elevated seating extending from the middle of the floor to the back of the 
hall is a semi-circle of chairs located between the main seating area and the stage. The people in 
this intermediary area are dressed formally in contrast to the throng seated behind them. The 
members of this group appear to be affiliated with the FN as the majority of them are wearing large 
clip-on badges and seem to be acquainted with one another – shaking hands and patting each other 
on the back. After a few minutes pass, timid strains of the French national anthem can be heard 
amidst the crowd and as more voices join in the group seated in the middle section rise and face 
the audience. When the song ends the convention hall erupts into cheers, the lights suddenly dim, 
and Marine Le Pen’s face and voice dominate the room from the screen at the head of the stage.  
The FN’s new campaign video is playing and we are introduced to Le Pen standing on a 
rocky shoreline looking out over the Atlantic Ocean. She is narrating her love for France that she 
says she has felt for as long as she can remember. As she strolls along the beach we are confronted 
with the firm declaration that France is a country that does not submit and the French people are a 
people who never give up. Next, we see Le Pen thumbing through family photo albums as she 
explains the different roles that she has held in life: woman, mother, and lawyer. The emphasis on 
kinship at this particular point in the video underscores the concept of family as the foundation of 
the nation. At the close of this segment she asserts that above all she is “intensely, proudly, 
faithfully, and unequivocally French.” Through the video there are short clips of Le Pen carrying 
out a variety of activities such as attending conferences, speaking with reporters, sailing a boat, 
and, notably, riding a horse. This last image is followed immediately by a shot of the bronze Joan 
of Arc statue in Paris. The final image that appears on the screen before it goes dark is a shot of 
the Elysée (the French presidential residence) and as the video fades out Le Pen’s voice 






emphatically punches out the phrase “In the Name of the People” at the same time the text appears 
on the screen framed by a bouquet of white roses. 
The lights turn up and slow-paced, folk music plays over the speakers. Anticipation mounts 
as the audience members wave their flags while awaiting the entrance of Le Pen. Suddenly there 
is a shift in tone as the song is exchanged for one with a faster tempo. Marine Le Pen enters the 
hall smiling and surrounded by her entourage of campaign staffers. Le Pen begins a quick tour of 
the room, shaking audience members’ hands as she moves through the space between the semi-
circle of FN-affiliated attendees and the rest of the audience. Upon reaching the podium amidst 
cries of “Marine Présidente!” she pauses for a moment before shouting “Ladies and Gentlemen” 
following which there is an immediate hush. Le Pen begins to recite her prepared speech and the 
camera zooms out to show the form of the party leader juxtaposed against the large scope of the 
audience. The scene appears to cast Marine Le Pen as a humble figure in front of the hundreds of 
attendees – a politician close to the people – as well as to show that the event is one of great 
magnitude.  
Arms outstretched and legs positioned in a stance as if ready to sprint, Le Pen launches 
into what will be an hour-long speech with gusto. Having already identified that this presidential 
election is unlike any other in French history and that it constitutes a “choix de civilization,” Le 
Pen goes on to reproach her opponents for denying that there is such a thing as French culture and 
promises that as president she would protect that intangible capital belonging to the French, this 
“capital immatériel.” Le Pen declares that she will, in fact, be defending the very walls that support 
the patrimoine. What exactly does Le Pen intend to shield France from? A few lines later Le Pen 
reveals what she considers to be the greatest threats that France is currently facing: globalization, 
mass immigration, and Islamic fundamentalism. All three menace French values or the “valeurs 
de civilization” and all three are linked because it was globalization that gave birth to increased 
immigration in France which led to communautarisme10 which then fostered the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
Le Pen explicitly reminds people of all origins and all creeds that have been welcomed in 
France that in France “there will be no other laws and there will be no other values than French 
ones.” In this instance it is evident how Le Pen seeks to make a distinction between members of 
the collective who can claim to be français d’origine and those who cannot so as to indicate which 
citizens have an inherent right to France. At a more implicit level in her rhetoric, Le Pen seems to 
be questioning the possibility of immigrants’ successful assimilation into French society. 
Seemingly denying the possibility of a dynamic and welcoming society for immigrants, Le Pen 
proposes a rigid “solution” regarding immigration which she considers to be a threat.  
The audience seems to approve of Le Pen’s statement as it erupts into applause, cheers, 
and indiscernible chanting that lasts for multiple seconds. Following this point in the oration the 
audience members collectively chant “Présidente Marine” following each declaration of a specific 
policy that she promises to pursue as president. Some of Le Pen’s policies include sending foreign 
prisoners back to their home countries, relocating food production to a more local level, and 
holding a referendum on the issue of leaving the European Union. During the final ten minutes of 
the speech Le Pen seems to go off script, quickly interjecting anecdotes in a casual tone that 
contrast with her performative rhetoric. These side bars often began with “dear friends” and it 
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seems as though she is endeavoring to speak more directly and personally with the audience. This 
style of speaking combined with the increased responses of the crowd established a less reserved 
tone at the speech’s close. 
 
MLP’s Double Discourse on Alterity 
The declaration that Le Pen makes at the beginning of her speech regarding immigration in France 
being linked to Islamic fundamentalism and, therefore, a cause for the terrorism that has taken 
place in France in recent years is an example of the double discourse that she employs in her party 
speeches. Through these terms Le Pen indicates the FN’s position on immigration to the extent 
that mass immigration has negatively impacted the country and immigrants must be expected to 
abide by French laws. Although Le Pen does not comment further on any specific groups living in 
the country, it would appear as though she seeks to incriminate Arab Muslim immigrants. This is 
evidenced by the continual association of immigration with Islamic fundamentalism in her parole. 
This example of double discourse is particularly threatening and points to one of two types of 
nationalist discourses that Le Pen relies on to appeal to her supporters.  
 The first form of nationalist discourse is that of a feel-good nationalism that relies on a 
passionate sentiment for France and amorous, idealist depictions of the country and its timeless 
history, culture, and language. History frequently surfaced during the duration of Le Pen’s 
pronouncements, yet it was less of a focal point than an underlying presence that Le Pen seemed 
to cite in order to provide her descriptions with credibility. When she notes that France is a 
“millennium-old country,” for instance, she appears to be depending on a representation of French 
history she presumes to exist in the minds of her listeners that depicts it as ideal and incapable of 
wrongdoing. Similarly, when she emphasizes that it will be necessary to “defend and promote the 
historic and cultural homeland” Le Pen is trying to appeal to a certain conceptualization of France 
that includes its long history that the FN upholds as unchanging (Alduy and Wahnich 2015).  
Le Pen’s sweeping statements on French culture, language, and history give way to more 
aggressive nationalist sentiments in the second half of the oration. As terrorism and globalization 
are imminently threatening France, according to Le Pen, there is a need to apply strict policies in 
areas like immigration. In the midst of a harsh tirade concerning foreigners living in France she 
declares: “Those who come to France – it should be for finding France – not for changing it to the 
image of their country of origin. If they would like to live as if they were in their home countries, 
then it would be best if they were to stay in their home countries.” This statement is an example 
of the second type of nationalist rhetoric that Marine Le Pen employs: an incendiary nationalism. 
This nationalism concerns the “exclusive France” that French citizens must defend from foreign 
danger and the ideas it contains mimics statements that Jean Marie Le Pen made at the time of the 
party’s inception. Marine Le Pen has simply replaced her father’s “Préférence Nationale” with 
“Priorité Nationale” and speaks through a discourse that attempts to alienate Arab Muslim 
immigrants disguised in republican universalist language (Shields 2014). 
In Marine Le Pen Prise aux mots Cécile Alduy and Stéphane Wahnich’s argue that the 
ideology of the Front National has remained unchanged between 1972 and today despite the image 
cleaning it has undergone since its change of leadership in 2011. Through a comparison of word 
choice, word frequency, semantic structure, and underlying themes in Jean Marie Le Pen’s and 
Marine Le Pen’s speeches they found there was little discernible difference between the prior and 
current FN presidents’ rhetorics. Their conclusion indicates that Marine Le Pen relies on a 
discourse masked in republican language and cloaked in a certain nationalist mythological 





in the country. The primary myth she recounts through speeches replete with French history, 
patriotism, and French republican values at events that visually reflect these concepts is the 
falsehood that Frenchness and multiculturalism oppose one another. 
  The mythological format of Le Pen’s rhetoric has to do with the idea of a timeless France. 
As part of Le Pen’s feel-good nationalism, this mythology centers on the FN’s presentation of 
French culture, language, and history that find their form through a Christian heritage. As the 
millennium-old France comes up against forces that threaten the nation’s political, social, 
religious, and cultural values there are certain measures which must be taken to defend the patrie. 
One object of these mythological narratives is to make them appear beyond reproach. By appealing 
to certain aspects of French life that the majority of français d’origine could identify with, Le Pen 
attempts to define Frenchness as opposed to the culture, language, and history of the Other living 
in France.  
 
Semiotics of the Assises Présidentielles 
Le Pen’s words appear simplistic yet conceal a certain complexity that can be uncovered with 
signifiers based in the setting of the Assises Présidentielles event. Certain elements such as the 
color scheme, the auditory landscape including the music, the presence of certain symbols such as 
the blue and white roses, and the presentation of the event itself (the way in which the FN chose 
to film and edit the video of the event that it published online) all reveal a deeper signification 
within Le Pen’s orations. These aspects point to the conceptualization of Frenchness the FN seeks 
to convey. With the party’s attempts to demonstrate patriotic valor it is worth asking what certain 
symbolic acts such as collectively singing the French national anthem or presenting images of Joan 
of Arc signify in particular for the Front National. 
The campaign video juxtaposes Marine Le Pen and Joan of Arc briefly, yet purposefully. 
There is a short shot of Le Pen riding a horse at an equestrian event quickly followed by an image 
of the Joan of Arc statue at Place des Pyramides in Paris that similarly features the hero atop a 
horse. Placing the two side by side signals an homage to the past and an attempt to associate Joan 
of Arc’s ideal leadership with that of Marine Le Pen’s. In this way the FN is attempting to 
symbolically manipulate French history so that it takes on new meanings in conformation to its 
ideology. Additionally, in « La France aux Français » (1993), wherein Pierre Birnbaum examines 
the historic identity of French nationalism, he explains how the FN has long relied on Joan of Arc 
as a dominant symbol to represent the party. Joan of Arc originally emerged as a counter symbol 
to the republican and secular Marianne who stood for laïcité in the public forum. In this way Joan 
of Arc acted within what Shields (2014) calls the anti-system stance of the FN that opposes itself 
to the left. The FN has been able to profit from this symbol further with Marine Le Pen as its 
president. Similarly, Le Pen chose the blue rose as the emblem of her 2017 presidential campaign 
because of how it “symbolizes the impossible that we make possible.”11 As the socialist party in 
France has historically represented itself with a red rose, the FN seems to have set itself in further 
opposition to the left with its new symbol. 
Although the FN is opposed to ethnic, cultural, and religious difference, it has employed a 
more universalist language (“it is only together that we will all succeed”) since 2011 when Marine 
Le Pen began to reference the republican principles of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and laïcité in her 
speeches (Alduy and Wahnich 2015). In the speech she delivered at the Assises Présidentielles 
event Le Pen carefully mentioned the core values of universalism, but in such a way so as to lend 
credibility to her more inciting statements. For instance, she asserts that the majority of French 






citizens still recognize the “preeminence of the person and therefore his sanctity, individual liberty 
and therefore individual consent, the national morale and therefore national solidarity, shared 
equality and therefore the refusal of situations that call for submission.” Through this ambiguous 
statement Le Pen seems intent on elevating the individual citizen above the collective which 
directly contradicts the intent of the French social contract. According to Le Pen, “These principles 
for which we have fought are confirmed in our national maxim “liberty, equality, brotherhood” 
that are themselves derived from a secularization of principles produced by our Christian heritage.” 
Liberty, equality, and brotherhood indeed form an integral part of how the French present their 
political identity, yet Le Pen seems to name these values in order to confirm the FN’s own set of 
principles. Does this method of employing a particular discourse that seems to rely on republican 
universalism differ from that which other public figures in France employ? 
Through a discourse that seeks to reinforce certain conceptualizations of Frenchness and 
seems to draw from basic republican ideas Marine Le Pen has been successful in reaching a level 
of transparency within her speeches. This success is evident in the increasing popularity that the 
FN has experienced amongst citizens who have not traditionally identified with the far right. The 
heightened interest in the FN could also be reflective of what appears to be a larger shift recently 
in Western politics towards conservatism. However, the feel-good and incendiary nationalist 
rhetorics that Le Pen employs also seem to confirm the presence of the “nation Thing” that Slavoj 
Žižek observed in the Eastern European states at the close of the 20th century. Žižek identifies the 
“nation Thing” as the base of nationalism and argues that it “persists unchanged” (56). This Thing 
(national enjoyment) is defined in relation to a collective’s relationship to an Other, for while this 
enjoyment is inaccessible to the Other it is nonetheless threatened by the Other (54). As a result, 
the expression of nationalist interest in the mainstream population is particularly worrisome for 
the minorities living in French society who are not seen as belonging to the national identity. 
Citizens who are considered français d’origine étrangère such as Arab Muslim immigrants are 
those perceived as this Other. They are portrayed as incapable of acquiring Frenchness due to a 
combination of their origins, ethnicity, cultural practices, and religion. Le Pen is one of many 
français d’origine voices who elevate the native population above the population perceived as 
foreign and the FN is one of many institutions that attempts to control the meanings of Frenchness. 
 
The “Genius” of French Secularism and the Limits of Universalism 
When I came across the book Génie de la laïcité by Caroline Fourest during my most recent trip 
to Paris I was immediately struck by its blunt title: Génie de la laïcité which roughly translates to 
“The Genius of French Secularism.” Laïcité refers to a French political philosophy that seeks to 
separate religious and public life and has dominated public discourse in France in recent years. In 
the introduction to Génie Fourest critiques how laïcité is commonly translated as “secularism” in 
English. She posits that as laïcité is distinct from American and other Western secularist systems 
(15-16) and is unique in the world it should retain its French appellation. A short subtext that 
appears below the title and next to a photo of the author reads: “laïcité is not a sword, but a shield.” 
Likening laïcité to a defensive tool points even further to the book’s polemic contents. Finding a 
publication that so blatantly declares a position on laïcité is quite useful for examining the various 
social debates it weaves together.  
In Génie Fourest offers a strict definition of French republican universalism in regard to 
the laïque integration of religion that she defends. As an example of a socio-political essay, Génie 
constitutes an example of popular intellectual reading in French society that is widely available in 





writings on a large scale it follows that these texts are integral in constructing the shared national 
imaginary. When Fourest’s book on laïcité was released in October 2016 an article12 in Le Monde 
described it as an addition to the “innumerable texts published on the subject” including Jean-
Louis Bianco’s La France est-elle laïque ? that had been released a few days after Génie. The 
proliferation of essays and books on socio-political topics works to constantly reframe and 
reposition collective understandings of religion, laïcité, and history in France, for example. 
Ultimately, Frenchness is a product of these textual debates. 
Fourest’s Génie de la laïcité could be considered part of what the group Qui fait la France 
calls an “outlet for bourgeois dispositions” (Thomas 2013, 192). Qui fait la France is made up of 
“banlieue writers” who write about their experiences as second or third generation immigrants 
living on the periphery of French cities in a country that seeks to exclude them. The presence of 
these banlieue writers and their publications is extremely significant in a culturally homogenous 
society that venerates français d’origine authors like Fourest. In view of there being ample 
publications by ethnic minority authors living in France why is Fourest’s discourse on laïcité 
widely available while accounts of Arab and Muslim citizens for whom laïque-based laws 
adversely affect are absent? 
Feminist scholar Joan Wallach Scott, who analyzes the perception of Muslim women and 
the head scarf in French society, poses a similar question that she answers in her conclusion to The 
Politics of the Veil (2007). Scott critiques Caroline Fourest’s winning of the French National 
Assembly’s Prix du livre politique (political book prize) in 2006 for La tentation obscurantiste 
because despite the limitations of Fourest’s scope and argument in the work, her overt support of 
the French government’s nationalist agenda allowed her to win the prize. The absence of minority 
citizens’ perspectives in textual form reveal a way in which these citizens are invisible within the 
national imaginary. In order to fully analyze the role a publication like Fourest’s plays in the 
national discourse it is necessary to consider Fourest’s positionality as a white, bourgeois, français 
d’origine as well as how she endeavors to speak for all members of society through asserting the 
apparent perfection of laïcité.  
According to Fourest, the laïque system represents the ultimate socio-political model. In 
the chapter “An Exemplary History” she asserts how laïcité is “absolutely ideal for a country like 
France,” and how it, “would be necessary to be crazy or oblivious to try and dismantle what 
centuries of struggle, fury, and patience succeeded to build and adjust to the exact milometer” 
(115). In each of the five chapters that make up Génie Fourest staunchly defends this claim. In the 
first chapter, “False Trial and Empoisoned Propagandas,” she endeavors to respond to what she 
identifies as attacks laïcité has received in recent years; namely from western democracies that do 
not ascribe to the same type of secularism. In the following chapter, “The War of Ideals is 
Declared,” Fourest discusses other countries in possession of secular systems that attempt to 
imitate French laïcité. Throughout “An Exemplary History” Fourest details the “correct” formation 
of laïcité because, as she states in the opening line, “Everyone claims to know the history of laïcité. 
However, there are numerous styles, “democratic” or “republican” to relay.” In “Fracture Lines” 
Fourest provides a modern context for political and educational uses of laïcité and in “For an 
Authentic Laïque Politics” Fourest concludes by making recommendations for French society in 
terms of religious-secular separation.  
As laïcité apparently is, “one of the most generous utopias, one of the most brotherly and 
the most brilliantly imagined in recent decades,” (12) Fourest believes that laïcité is able to equally 
provide for all members of French society and ensures harmonious social cohesion. As an ideal 
                                                          





system that claims not to recognize any one religion above another, it is only when certain 
institutions or governments do not correctly implement laïcité that it appears to fail. There are 
multiple politicians in France, for instance, who do not appropriately configure this ideal political 
philosophy though they claim to prescribe to its standards. As a result, there are public figures who 
refer to laïcité in name only and do not attempt to employ it in its true, or natural form. 
 This difference between laïcités often comes down to partisan lines. The right and left in 
France apparently see themselves as representing different versions of this socio-political 
philosophical system. As each side attempts to control the “official” view of laïcité, each arguing 
that it encapsulates it in its ideal state, it is evident that these debates fashion laïcité into its current 
form. Regardless of the meanings that laïcité has possessed through time and the ways in which it 
should and could function in France, the method by which political and social actors in France 
actually present it in discourse determines its actual role in French society. Perhaps one of the most 
fiercely contested issues in France that reveals this ideological division concerning laïcité is the 
debate on headscarves. Fourest discusses the issue at great length in Génie and unequivocally 
advocates for their removal from the public sphere. The headscarf debate returns to the question 
of differing laïcités and the français d’origine control of Frenchness. 
 In 2004 President Jacques Chirac passed a law banning the “ostentatious” presentation of 
religious symbols in public space. This particular ban has significantly affected France’s Muslim 
population because Muslim girls who would normally choose to veil are legally forbidden to wear 
a hijab or any other type of head covering in public schools. In 2010 President Nicolas Sarkozy 
implemented a law that banned covering the face in public meaning women could no longer wear 
an article of clothing like the burqa in public without being fined. Fourest argues that the law 
Chirac put into effect was in the spirit of laïcité and the 2010 law Sarkozy passed – while seeming 
to possess a laïque air – was in fact nothing more than a security measure. Fourest describes 
Sarkozy’s presidency as not truly representing laïcism (202) along with other conservative 
politicians who claim to employ laïcité, yet do not enact it as it was historically intended. 
Veiling has also received a high level of attention in Europe as a whole because European 
states often choose to interpret women wearing head coverings as an affront to women’s rights, 
national security, and secular rights. In the French case, certain scholars (Amiraux, 2009; Bowen 
2007; Guénif, 2007; Keaton 2006; Scott 2007) have identified the impact that a push for equality 
in public space has had on individual religious freedoms. Meanwhile, Fourest asserts that only an 
equality that enforces an absolute separation of religious beliefs and symbols from public life is 
able to protect all of the inhabitants of France, especially its minority populations. Scott proposes 
that this separation constitutes “political radicalism” that has not led to the peaceful protection of 
all, but the tense alienation of a few (19). Fourest compares the French laïque system with 
America’s secularist one which she describes as threatening equality for all members of the 
collective because it places the religious freedom of certain individuals above the needs of the 
whole group.13 In these instances, however, if there are certain policies that encourage the othering 
of certain citizens, then are these not the members of society who are most in need of protection 
and support?  
In consideration of Matti Bunzl’s (2007) discussion on historic anti-Semitism and current 
day Islamophobia in Europe it would appear that French veil laws are a result of the widely-held 
European belief that integrating Muslims into European society is not possible. While Anti-
Semitism in Europe consisted of religious-based discrimination during the 19th century before it 
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transformed into a racial form of discrimination during the 20th century, the present-day 
mistreatment of Muslims in European societies is rooted in the perspective that Islam is 
incompatible with the European model (13). Within this strict assessment, then, Muslims are 
simply unassimilable whereas European Jews are now considered to be ideal citizens because of a 
successful assimilation into European society. 
 My French host parents constitute an example of how certain types of bodies are seen as 
assimilable where others, are not. In the introduction I mention how proud my host father was that 
his family was an authentic French family. With the perspective that race and religious affiliation 
possess an essential link to a certain culture, I believed all members of my host family to be français 
d’origine citizens. A discovery that complicated my understanding of français d’origine was 
learning my host mother was born in Poland and had moved to Paris in her early twenties. In view 
of the genealogical component of the français d’origine identity, my host mother could not trace 
her ancestry through France, and was therefore not a native French citizen. Nonetheless, her white 
racial identity, her ability to speak French fluently and with an almost imperceptible accent, and 
her full acceptance of French practices allowed her to operate as a full cultural French citizen. 
Fourest’s polemic argument in Génie de la laïcité reinforces the idea that certain types of 
citizens are capable of effortlessly assimilating into European society at the same time that other 
citizens could never reach a fully “civilized” status. The crux of Fourest’s staunch defense of laïcité 
rests on her assertion that a universalist management of French society seeks to protect all citizens 
from discrimination and exclusion. She concedes that racism is present in France, yet argues it is 
not a product of the State (48). Rather, racism results from society and universalism offers a 
solution to eliminate it. There are those who would argue that despite the implementation of laïque 
practices, French society continues to suffer from a lack of social cohesion. Fourest counters by 
explaining that France is a “well-mixed country” – more so than many countries in the West (22). 
In this context, Fourest actively conflates multiculturalism and multiethnicism. Her discussion 
shows the ways in which Frenchness forms and, as a result, discourses that initially seem to oppose 
one another begin to show numerous similarities.   
Marine Le Pen’s incendiary speeches and Caroline Fourest’s pro-Republic literature 
equally cause the translation of idealist republican universalism into social stigmatization for Arab 
Muslim immigrants. While the FN’s views not always appear to be in line with the State (the FN’s 
first leader, Jean Marie Le Pen, decried the Fifth Republic) and while Fourest’s work seems to 
support it (evidenced by her winning the National Assembly’s book award), both reinforce 
Frenchness in strict and exclusive ways. The ideological principles of the right and left do differ – 
the left sees itself as the sole defender of French republican principles and the right as preserving 
the patrie from external forces that wish to harm the country – yet they are united through a 
common habitus that each helps to produce. In what specific ways do Marine Le Pen’s and 
Caroline Fourest’s discourses approach one another?  
 
When Extremes Meet 
“The totalitarianism that threatens the century aligns itself with God at every 
opportunity. Beneath the green, brown flag of Islamism it raves, rapes, enslaves, 
decapitates and kills blindly.”14 
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“Don’t forget…that Islamic fundamentalism is barbaric, that it manifests itself in 
the world each day through murdering, massacring, and notably through employing 
the squalid and cowardly weapon of terrorism.”15 
 
On a first reading it may appear that these two excerpts originate from the same source. The first 
quote, from Fourest’s Génie, and the second, from Le Pen’s Assises Présidentielles speech, both 
express the belief that Islamic fundamentalism endangers France because of how it seeks to 
violently harm others as a result of its adherents’ inherent barbarity. Fourest’s and Le Pen’s 
perspectives further approach one another through their explicit denouncement of the recent terror 
attacks which serve as a point of shared fear in French society and the sous entendu that Islam is 
incompatible with the French republican system. Marine Le Pen argues that restricting 
immigration will protect French citizens from further terror attacks and Fourest proposes that 
absolute adherence to the French laïque system will constitute France’s preservation in the face of 
uncivilizedness yet both ultimately seek to portray Islam and other forms of alterity as antithetical 
to Frenchness. Despite their apparent ascription to different political ideologies, Le Pen and 
Fourest actively construct Frenchness through their extreme and exclusive discourses. With each 
attempt to portray French identity as unmalleable and essential they each contribute to Frenchness 
as it currently exists in France. 
Fourest expresses that her work specifically promotes religious integration and opposes 
extremism (10), yet the laïque system for which she advocates is so strict that it can be viewed as 
extremist in its own right. Although Fourest attempts to distinguish laïcité from religion, both 
require their adherents to follow a certain set of conditions in a prescribed manner. It would seem 
that some of the very aspects Fourest decries in Islamic Fundamentalism are present in her own 
belief system. Fourest would have every aspect of social, communal life constantly observed so as 
to monitor for religious ideologies entering the public sphere, allowing French republicanism to 
become the dominant ideology enforcing its practices amidst its members. As a result, Fourest’s 
claims that complete and utter separation of religion and secularism leads to the equal protection 
for all citizens are not accurate.  
Since taking leadership of the FN in 2011, Marine Le Pen has employed universalist 
language similar to Fourest’s. Le Pen claims she seeks to protect French heritage in order to 
provide a pristine country for future generations, yet she would do this by limiting the ability of 
foreign citizens to legally enter the country. Fourest similarly seeks to moderate the actions of 
Muslims by forcing Muslim women already living in France who veil to remove their head 
coverings in public. Le Pen and Fourest each view their model as the only way to successfully 
preserve French society in the face of imminent threats and Fourest, in particular, takes every 
opportunity through interviews, her blog16, and publications17 to strongly oppose her ideological 
principles to those of Le Pen. Despite this desire to create distance from one another – at least on 
Fourest’s part – each strives to “preserve” France by enforcing the notion that Arab Muslim 
immigrants constitute an Other in France.  
While the FN on the extreme right and Fourest and her contemporaries on the extreme left 
each project specific images of France (France the millennium-old nation or France the refuge of 
all citizens) there are certain institutions in France that claim that they seek to present a counter 
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perspective on alterity and immigration than that which dominates society. Through analyzing the 
permanent exhibit on immigration at the National Musuem for the History of Immigration it will 
be useful to examine the ways in which this claim is carried out.  
 
The French Colonial Past at the Palais de la Porte Dorée  
Attempting to orient myself after stepping off the tram at the Porte Dorée station I paused in front 
of an enclosed grassy area lined by palm trees and split in half by a cascading fountain. At the far 
end of the lawn a golden figure who appeared to be raising something toward the sky stood on a 
marble pedestal. Perplexed at first by the presence of a grandiose garden with this statue of Athena 
located in the middle of a Paris street, once I caught a glimpse of the Palais de la Porte Dorée 
(“Palace of the Golden Door”) the scene became more congruous.  
The Palace houses the National Museum for the History of Immigration (CNHI) and during 
my visit in January 2017 I learned that it was originally the site of  the “Museum of the Colonies” 
at the Exposition Coloniale Internationale de 1931 (“International Colonial Exposition of 1931”). 
The purpose of the Exposition during its six month running period was to showcase the cultural 
elements of the various civilizations that were in France’s possession. Representative of an art 
déco style with exterior walls covered in bas reliefs depicting exotic places and people and 
encircled by a series of columns, the Palace cast a commanding presence on Avenue Daumesnil. 
The interior equally caught my attention with its high vaulted ceilings, grand staircases, and a ball 
room covered in vibrant, floor-to-ceiling frescoes of dark-skinned women standing in tropical 
fauna gazing at a French galleon approaching from the sea. The scene thematically reflected the 
museums that succeeded one another in the Palace before the current one took their place.  
The 1931 Museum of the Colonies gave way to the Museum of Overseas France in 1935 
which in 1961 became the Museum of African and Oceania until the current institution opened in 
2007. With its mission of telling the story of two centuries of immigration in France the National 
Museum for the History of Immigration claims it seeks to present French history differently than 
the previous museums in the space by showcasing immigration through ethnographic means. I 
explore whether the CNHI actually conveys a new form of discourse regarding immigrants and 
French history or reiterates the dominant perspectives on alterity from within the collective 
imaginary. In order to tell the story of immigration in France the permanent exhibit, Repères, 
(“Landmarks”) is broken into nine different sequences which include: “To Emigrate,” “Facing the 
State,” “Host Country, Hostile France,” “Here and There,” “Places to Live,” “At Work,” 
“Rootedness,” “Sports,” and “Diversity.” One of the museum’s intermediaries, Mathieu Nouvel, 
explains that the purpose of breaking the exhibit into these specific portions is to show the process 
that immigrants historically have had to endure in order to live and work in the French Republic.18 
These nine segments are broken into artistic, historic, and ethnographic elements that fill the space 
and represent the particular theme of the sequence. Before arriving at the first repère, “To 
Emigrate,” I had to reach the second floor by climbing one of the grand staircases that acted as an 
exhibit in and of itself.  
Painted along the wall going up the stairs was a timeline of inscriptions that described 
moments in French immigration history. The timeline began in 1789 with the French Revolution, 
an event that is considered to have launched the birth of the modern French State. As the 
Revolution redefined French citizenship and what it should consist of (it depends on engagement 
with the collective) the museum seemed to believe it was an appropriate place to start. Certain 
legal, social, and migratory monuments related to immigration in France climbed in years as the 






visitor climbed in steps. These moments included the passage of particular immigration laws, the 
creation of immigration advocacy groups, and the successive independence movements of former 
French colonies. For example, in 1945 France extended citizenship to the children of immigrants 
born on French soil; in 1954 Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos became independent followed by 
Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 and Algeria in 1962; and in 1958 the Fonds d’actions sociale was 
created to aid Algerian workers living in France. Despite this mixed collection, it seemed as though 
the majority of the events featured on the wall centered on French immigration policy.  
The legal focus within the timeline along the wall reflects the close (and often tenuous) 
relationship between immigrants and the state and unequivocally displays the mediating role 
citizenship plays in this relationship as a hallmark of the modern nation state (Petryna1 and Follis 
2015). In the French context in particular many scholars have remarked on the tendency in France 
to rely on what anthropologist John Bowen (2007) calls “statutory solutions” (243) to remedy 
social issues. Oftentimes the French government will officially codify measures that would 
otherwise be enacted temporarily, and, or at local levels. This dependency on more official forms 
of legislation in social life is evident throughout the entire museum and seems to force immigrants 
into a humble position in relation to the State and devices like the French immigration history 
timeline effectively serve as a reminder of one’s privilege to be a citizen.  
As the CNHI is closely overseen by multiple departments within the French government, 
its inclusion of official State discourse is unsurprising, yet through his analysis of the CNHI 
mission (2013) anthropologist Dominic Thomas proposes that it seeks to fill a particular role 
French museums normally would not. While the majority of French museums exist to conserve, 
the National Museum for the History of Immigration was formed with the intent of “narrating, 
documenting, and recording a particular history” (46). However, I would argue that all museums 
seek to tell a particular story and those that conserve certain objects equally preserve certain 
narratives associated with them. While the CNHI may have been conceptualized with the purpose 
of sharing an inclusive perspective on immigration in French history (44) I argue that the discourse 
it espouses omits a discussion on French colonial heritage which directly relates to French 
immigration. As I describe my visit of the Repères exhibit I explore how notions of French national 
belonging are being constructed through the space of the museum that encapsulates its discourse, 
its declared mission, and its heritage.  
 
Exhibiting Immigration, Showcasing Alterity 
 
“Is this exhibition a legacy or a beginning?”19 
 
This quote, attributed to Maréchal Lyautey who oversaw the 1931 Colonial Exhibition, is a 
question the National Museum for the History of Immigration seems to be asking itself. While 
Lyautey was referring to the future of the French colonial empire, his statement could easily be 
referencing the museum’s current positionality. How does the CNHI view its role in French society 
in relation to a heritage of French colonialism as well as the ongoing conversation on immigration? 
I argue the permanent exhibit Repères, as the institution’s primary form of discourse, attempts to 
provide a neutral assessment regarding French immigration history, so as to avoid challenging the 
state apparatus. As a result, the exhibit omits certain realities from the narrative regarding 
immigrants’ experiences in France at the same time that it fails to comment on the role of the State 
in the lived experiences of these immigrants. While the exhibit does present negative aspects 
                                                          





associated with living in France as an immigrant these conditions are not shown as being tied to 
any action of the French government, rather, they appear to constitute a fundamental consequence 
of immigration.  
  The first section of Repères, “To Emigrate,” introduces the immigration narrative that 
progresses chronologically as well as thematically through the course of the exhibit. The most 
prominent element within this first part of the exhibit was the ethnographic focus. There were 
multiple display cases filled with various possessions related to travel such as family photos, 
tickets, transportation schedules, clothing, personal items, and talismans. In one display case there 
was an open suitcase filled with a collection of mementos including documents, an Indian flag, a 
plate of incense, and other smaller items. In addition to the display cases that contained personal 
affects there was a large piece of artwork, Mircea Cantor’s Like birds on high-voltage wire (2009), 
that filled a corner of the room. The sculpture appeared to be a tapestry loom, but instead of fabric 
strands hanging from the top to the bottom of the wooden frame there were thin metal wires that 
stretched horizontally across the open space. Hanging from each of the seven wires was a 
collection of wooden and metal spoons. Each of the rows contained a different number of wooden 
and metal spoons with the majority of wooden ones hanging from the first row and the majority of 
metal ones hanging from the bottom row.  According to the display text accompanying the piece, 
the spoons represented the fixedness that often characterizes the legal processes associated with 
moving across borders. According to Cantor, unlike birds, immigrants are unable to fly across 
country borders. 
Finally, the last element within the emigration section of the exhibit consisted of display 
plates describing the process of emigrating from a country of origin and immigrating to France. 
The texts emphasized the distinction between emigration and immigration and highlighted certain 
reasons that members of other nations have decided to immigrate to France during the past 200 
years. The sequence also pointed out the difficulties that immigrants often face through the process 
of migrating. Each of Repères’s sequences that followed including “Facing the State,” “Host 
Country, Hostile France,” “Here and There,” “Places to Live,” “At Work,” “Rootedness,” 
“Sports,” and “Diversity” similarly contained display cases, pieces of contemporary art that 
commented on immigration in some way, and display plates with text and pictures.  
Diversity, as the final landmark, provided a counterpart to the first stage on emigration and 
focused on emphasizing the rootedness of immigrants who live in France and the unique 
contributions that foreign populations make to the country. The space for this portion of the exhibit 
seemed larger than the other ones, yet it did not appear to contain more materials. In the center of 
the room stood a wooden structure composed of four walls covered in colorful paintings of people. 
The structure possessed three openings and upon walking into the large cube I was met by a variety 
of objects hanging from the ceiling. Included in the array were teapots, cooking utensils, pots and 
pans, a hookah pipe, masks, Japanese lanterns, and woven baskets. On the wall adjacent to the 
structure was a large record with songs written across the grooves of the disk in bright colors. The 
sign hanging alongside the record entitled “Jukebox” explained that like film, music constituted a 
way to express and represent migration, for exile has inspired a number of artists to create based 
on their situations. It was possible to select and listen to songs from the collection which included 
“Le Portugais” by Joe Dassin, Carte Séjour’s “Douce France,” and “Les Emigrants” by Charles 
Aznavour among others. As a conclusion to the exhibit, the diversity portion endeavored to make 
integration in France appear as an ensured result of immigrating to the country and made no 






A Legacy of Colonialism  
Although French colonization in North Africa and South East Asia provides a logical starting point 
for discussing historical periods of immigration in France the exhibit did not attempt to draw this 
connection. I did not observe any instances in the permanent exhibit where this history was being 
grappled with. Just as banlieue writers are largely absent from representations of the national story, 
Repères omits French colonialism from its representation of the French historical record. 
Similarly, just as Marine Le Pen claims that globalization is the cause of increased immigration to 
France, she fails to draw a parallel between French colonialism and modern globalization. It would 
appear as though the French collective imaginary purposefully excludes the French State’s role in 
inspiring great waves of movement from its colonies at the same time that it acknowledges the 
necessity of its mediation in overseeing the entry of foreigners. As a result, the CNHI represents 
immigration as part of French history, yet removes French history from the larger historical 
processes that shape the national story.  
Despite the CNHI’s attempts to include French immigration history within France’s larger 
historic narrative, the permanent exhibit’s discourse did not indicate it was actively seeking to 
reshape collective discourse related to alterity in French society. Repères’s sequences followed a 
progression from “emigration” to what could be seen as the “assimilation process” and terminating 
with “full assimilation” wherein a limited expression of cultural diversity was allowed for. This 
process reflects the model French social scientists used during the mid-20th century to describe the 
immigration of foreign workers and later the immigration of families in French society. The focus 
rested on their presence in France and ignored their ties to their countries of origin and the 
perpetual double absence (Sayad 1999) that characterized their existence (Bava 2010). The current 
view of immigration considers the process along the lines of integration instead of through 
assimilation and attempts to account for a more wholistic study of immigrants’ lived experiences. 
As a result, the CNHI’s exhibit seems to rely on presenting immigration through an outdated 
methodological framework even though it employs a terminology that is consistent with current 
anthropological conceptualizations of the social realities of immigration. 
This distinction between the overall structure of the exhibit and the terminology that it 
employs is evident in the emigration section of Repères that introduces immigration as a 
transnational issue. Despite the emphasis on this aspect of immigration the sequence does not 
attempt to convey Sayad’s observation, for instance, that this transnationalism is lived through and 
that immigrants carry this sense of equal absence from their home country and French society 
within themselves (225). It is as if the CNHI is offering a politically correct frame; an encasing 
that is void of a deeper signification that would signal to immigrants and descendants of 
immigrants living in France that the French government acknowledges their struggle. Similarly, 
in the sequences “Facing the State” and “Host Country, Hostile France” the discourse notes the 
legal hardships and physical barriers that immigrants experience in French society such as facing 
strenuous legal processing, being forced to live in low quality housing, and frequently working for 
low pay. The extent to which these sequences address the psychological hardships is the short 
discussion on racism that they included. Nonetheless, the Repères discourse placed the context for 
this racism within society without any effort to show the ways in which this social discrimination 
that targets Arab Muslim immigrants in particular is systematic and linked to the State.  
 
Diversity as Object 
The space in the CNHI reserved for showcasing France’s diversity was overwhelmingly optimistic. 





convey immigration in France as always successfully terminating with “full assimilation” was 
abrupt. The notable lack of a declared position on French colonialism and its negative impact on 
former members of those colonies (who make up a large proportion of immigrants who have 
migrated to France since the beginning of the 20th century) signaled the purposeful evasion of a 
postcolonial discussion. Instead, as two centuries of immigration to France has made it a “territory 
of meetings and of multiple cultures”20 (according to the CNHI’s website21) it would seem that the 
diversity sequence in the museum was constructed to represent these cultures and celebrate them 
in specific ways. Epstein discusses a similar perspective in regard to the fêtes de quartier, or 
festivals, in Cergy-St. Christophe that place immigrants on display with the goal of celebrating 
cultural points of difference within French society for short amounts of time (142). Celebration of 
diversity in France seeks to convey the idea that cultural difference such as linguistic, religious, 
ethnic variation enrich French society, yet this appreciation of difference is limited to events that 
take place for very limited amounts of time. I argue the museum’s “emigration,” “incomplete 
assimilation,” and “full assimilation” structure set across the sequences does not provide for an 
adequate multicultural understanding. 
In Dominic Thomas’s discussion (2013) of the National Museum for the History of 
Immigration he notes that commemoration and glorification are often associated in French 
museum settings, yet the CNHI does not engage in this tradition (45). The museum succeeds in 
uncoupling immigration from colonization (52), yet while colonization is not being glorified it is 
also not being addressed in general. In some ways Thomas seems to suggest the museum provides 
a counter discourse to the one which French society expresses regarding immigration. Thomas 
cites Jacques Toubon, the former French Minister of Culture and the leader of the CNHI project, 
who discusses how French society negatively views these members of society due to a “lack of 
historical perspective” (45) and states that the museum’s goal is to convey a certain historical 
narrative regarding immigration to combat this perspective (46). Despite Toubon’s 
acknowledgement of this stigma, the museum seems to reside within a State-led discourse that 
does not emphasize the role of the French colonial empire in the countries from which hundreds 
of thousands immigrants have moved to France during the 20th century. 
As evidenced by the particular institutions that inhabited the site before it, the Museum for 
the History of Immigration seems to have inherited a legacy that normalizes French colonialism. 
As the initial institution that occupied the Palais de la Porte Dorée, the Museum of the Colonies 
represented the enlightenment mindset regarding the necessity of a “colonizing mission” within 
North Africa and Southeast Asia. It was constructed for the International Colonial Exposition of 
1931, whose purpose was to pay homage to France’s colonial possessions by presenting certain 
cultural features from each of its territories. The exposition accomplished this by holding 
performances in pavilions constructed for the event and showcasing buildings modeled after 
structures that could be found in the regions that France occupied such as South East Asian temples 
like the Cambodian Angkor Vat. The architecture of the site was explicitly designed to demonstrate 
French dominance over its colonies and the Museum of the Colonies in particular was built with 
the purpose to endure after the exposition ended (Thomas 2013, 51). The integrity of the physical 
features of the building has endured as well as a certain general mentality regarding the role of 
colonialism.  
During my tour of the CNHI I was aware that the frescoes and other architectural elements 
of the décor were features from the 1930s. However, it was not until later that I realized another 
                                                          






aspect of the museum that had perplexed me at the time of my visit was similarly a vestige of a 
previous decade: an aquarium located in the basement of the building with a collection of tropical 
fish. In 1931 the emphasis of the exposition centered on conveying a certain level of authenticity 
in regard to the primitive savages they had on display. The aquarium possessed a very similar 
purpose in showcasing other forms of natural life from the French territories. The presence of the 
aquarium in the museum today seems to signal that the association still exists. How could an 
institution ever be successful in conveying the significance of human life when fish are housed in 
the same space? What does the continued presence of the aquarium in the basement of the Palais 
de la Porte Dorée indicate in relation to the subject matter that the museum presents upstairs? 
Thomas addresses a similar question when he proposes that French colonial power and French 
colonial labor present a complex relationship with the subjects (immigrants) who are presented in 
specific ways – mainly according to the ways in which they have contributed to French society, 
oftentimes in the form of hard labor (51).  
As the CNHI is closely tied to the State – as indicated by the numerous government 
ministries that control its operation and the frequent presidential visits it receives – I argue it 
maintains a traditional mode of discourse regarding immigrants that limits the discussion to one 
of basic understanding at the same time that it limits the discussion to a specific space; removed 
from the everyday. The museum honors cultural, linguistic, and religious differences, in its 
diversity sequence, for example, without fully recognizing the colonial thread weaving together 
North African immigration, the poor treatment of Arab Muslim immigrants in France, and the 
discourse of exclusion that the français d’origine produce. Just as cultural festivals held in certain 
banlieue cities with the stated purpose of distinguishing foreign contributions to society and 
seeking to “celebrate” diversity, yet simply succeed in showcasing the domination of français 
d’origine citizens, the CNHI reinforces the Frenchness of the majority.  
 
Conclusions 
On my most recent trip to France that took place during Christmas celebrations I found myself at 
the French dinner table once more. While I did not receive any history lessons, a grandfather in 
the family that I was staying with would point out ways in which I neglected to act according to 
certain French cultural practices. The pieces of advice were small and gently given, but I felt as 
though he was doing his utmost to fashion me unto a proper French cultural citizen. I wondered if 
he kept trying to enforce a certain Frenchness in regard to my behavior because he viewed me as 
assimilable. I also wondered if his pointing out the best manner to perform certain practices was a 
way to demonstrate his own cultural capital. While the acquisition of certain types of cultural 
capital is a major way in which one gains Frenchness, the additional presence of certain factors 
that translate to a certain cultural identity determine Frenchness to a greater degree. 
 Through the discourses français d’origine members of the collective produce this “native” 
population works to control the meanings of Frenchness in such a way so that it appears essential 
to observers. I have examined the process by which Frenchness is produced through engaging with 
some of these discourses. I found the continual debate that native French citizens hold on the 
interplay of cultural practices and biological, genealogical, and religious factors ultimately 
produces the meanings of Frenchness. By engaging with Marine Le Pen’s nationalist rhetoric, 
Caroline Fourest’s staunch defense of laïcité, and the Cité Nationale de l’Histoire de 
l’Immigration’s exhibit on French immigration history I found a disconnect between the inclusive 
position the Republican government communicates and society’s treatment of Arab Muslim 





discourse and practice in France yielded a profound understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
production of Frenchness.  
Just as scholars such as John Bowen, Beth Epstein, Didier Fassin, Danielle Trica Keaton, 
Joan Wallach Scott, and Nacira Guénif-Souilamas among many others have shown that français 
d’origine perceptions of français d’origine étrangère limit their inclusion in French society, I 
demonstrate the means by which français d’origine are able to create and reinforce a structure that 
excludes Arab Muslim immigrants. The textual domination of the français d’origine experience 
through the proliferation and wide availability of literature produced by français d’origine authors 
demonstrates a means by which certain ideologies are perpetuated within French habitus and how 
this reproduces itself. I am in agreement with Dominic Thomas (2007) who identifies the necessity 
to “relocate the origins of immigration discourse” so that a discussion that takes into account the 
reality of a dynamic Frenchness – one that acknowledges the mutability of culture and the 
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